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2 
Executive summary 
Historical evidence shows that many critical infrastructures in space and on the ground 
are vulnerable to the effects of space weather. Society relies increasingly on the services 
these infrastructures provide, and the risks from extreme space weather should be 
assessed to ensure adequate preparedness in industry and society. 
In order to take stock of space-weather risk reduction efforts in the EU over the past five 
years and to identify remaining gaps, the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre, 
the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, and the UK Met Office, with the support of 
NOAA’s Space Weather Prediction Centre, jointly organised a 2-day Summit on the 
impact of extreme space weather on critical infrastructures on 29-30 November 2016 in 
Ispra, Italy. The objectives of the summit were to discuss the state of play in reducing 
the risks of extreme space-weather impacts on infrastructures, discuss transboundary 
effects and the associated challenges for operators and emergency response, and to 
provide a platform for exchange and coordination among the stakeholders. 
The “Space Weather and Critical Infrastructures” Summit was attended by almost 50 
representatives of European infrastructure operators, regulators, crisis-response experts, 
academia, the European Space Agency, NOAA, the US Department of State, the US 
Science and Technology Policy Institute, NASA and the European Commission.  
The main workshop conclusions are: 
• Extreme space weather has a global footprint and can affect multiple ground- and 
space-based infrastructures at the same time. An event of such magnitude could 
overwhelm a single nation’s response capacity. 
• Some countries have recognised the threat of extreme space weather and have 
included it in their strategic national risk assessment. 
• There is a need to develop methodologies and tools for assessing interdependencies 
between critical infrastructures. 
• A multi-risk governance approach is needed to address cascading effects and the 
different stakeholders that often manage the risk in isolation from each other. 
• A pan-European vulnerability assessment of the power transmission grid should be 
carried out to identify criticalities and the potential for transboundary effects in case 
of extreme space weather. 
• Infrastructure operators should assess if hidden vulnerabilities to space weather are 
embedded in their systems, for example via dependencies on GNSS. 
• Significant knowledge gaps in physical and impact modelling persist. These gaps 
strongly affect early-warning capabilities and preparedness in industry. 
• Better communication between science and industry is needed to provide relevant, 
reliable and usable information to operators for decision making. 
• In Europe and the USA, 24/7 space-weather forecasting capabilities are available to 
support the early warning of government and industry. 
• There is a need for consistency in forecasting and for coordination of forecasts from 
different service providers. 
• A strategic plan should be developed to define the roles of the key players in Europe. 
This can include the establishment of a centralised European strategic decision-
making capability for coordinating space-weather risk mitigation and response at a 
pan-European level. 
• The USA has issued a National Space Weather Strategy that defines high-level 
strategic goals and actions for increasing preparedness levels. 
3 
1 Introduction 
Many modern critical infrastructures are vulnerable to the effects of natural hazards. Of 
increasing concern is extreme space weather that can have serious impacts on ground-
based and space-borne infrastructures. Space weather occurs across national boundaries, 
and crises in one country can easily spill over to neighbouring critical-infrastructure 
networks. Numerous space-weather impacts to the power grid, aviation, communication, 
and navigation systems have already been observed and documented. Since society 
relies increasingly on the services these infrastructures provide, awareness of the space-
weather threat needs to be raised and the risks from extreme space weather should be 
assessed to ensure adequate preparedness of infrastructure operators and society in 
general. 
Research efforts, in particular in North America and Europe, have been launched to 
better understand the impact of space weather on the many different types of critical 
infrastructures and to identify potential risk-reduction approaches where needed. In 
addition, awareness-raising initiatives have engaged stakeholders related to power-grid 
operations, aviation, financial systems, rail transport, and crisis response to increase the 
resilience of critical infrastructures and society to space weather. In order to take stock 
of space-weather risk reduction efforts in the EU over the past five years and to identify 
remaining gaps, the European Commission’s Joint Research Centre (JRC), the Swedish 
Civil Contingencies Agency (MSB), and the UK Met Office, with the contribution of the 
NOAA1 Space Weather Prediction Centre (SWPC), jointly organised a 2-day summit on 
the impact of extreme space weather on critical infrastructures on 29-30 November 2016 
at the JRC’s Ispra site. The objectives of the summit were to discuss the state of play in 
reducing the risks of extreme space-weather impacts on infrastructures, address the 
problem of transboundary effects and the associated challenges for operators and 
emergency response, and to provide a platform for exchange and coordination among 
the stakeholders. 
The “Space Weather and Critical Infrastructures” summit was attended by almost 50 
representatives of European infrastructure operators, regulators, crisis-response experts, 
academia, ESA2, NOAA, the US Department of State, the US Science and Technology 
Policy Institute, NASA3 and the European Commission. The workshop programme and the 
list of participants are provided in Annexes 1 and 2, respectively. 
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3 NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
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2 Space weather today 
Several countries have recognised the risks associated with extreme space weather and 
have launched initiatives to prevent, prepare for and respond to the threat. In the first 
session of the summit, six speakers from NOAA, the European Commission, Göttingen 
University, ESA, the US Department of State, and the Swedish Institute of Space Physics 
introduced the origin and characteristics of space weather and presented the status of 
space-weather research and policy in Europe and in the USA. 
Past space-weather impacts have demonstrated the vulnerability of both ground- and 
space-based infrastructures to this type of hazard. In addition, space weather has a 
global footprint and can therefore cause global impact, as demonstrated during the 
October 2003 space-weather storms: several satellites were damaged or suffered 
anomalies, numerous polar flights had to be rerouted, and there were reports of failure of 
GNSS4-based positioning and power disruptions in Europe, widespread HF outage over 
the African continent, and transformer damage in South Africa, as well as SatComm and 
HF outages in Asia and Australia.  
There are three different types of solar activity that are of concern for critical 
infrastructure operations: 1) solar flares, which trigger radio blackouts very quickly and 
affect radar, ground- and space-based communications, including high-frequency (HF) 
communication, and the GPS network causing loss of lock; 2) solar radiation storms, 
which are a threat to satellite operations, aviation and manned and robotic spaceflight; 
and 3) geomagnetic storms, caused by the ejection of magnetised solar plasma (so-
called Coronal Mass Ejection or CME) which interacts with Earth’s magnetosphere, 
causing impacts to satellite operations, GPS, aviation, rail transport and power-grid 
operations. Of particular concern is extreme space weather, such as the Carrington storm 
caused by a fast CME in 1859. A storm of such magnitude could result in major and 
possibly long-term disruptions of critical-infrastructure services with significant economic 
losses. It is believed that such a geomagnetic storm could overwhelm a single nation’s 
response capacities. The probability of Carrington-type space-weather events is assumed 
to lie between 6 and 12% within the next decade. However, for a major geomagnetic 
storm to occur on Earth, the triggering CME needs to be aimed at Earth and carry a 
southward magnetic field to be able to interact with the magnetosphere. 
The European Union (EU) disaster risk management policy covers prevention, 
preparedness and response for all types of disasters. In the EU there has been a shift 
away from disaster management towards disaster risk management (DRM), with risk 
assessment being seen as the very basis of DRM. The risk-assessment policy context is 
the Union Civil Protection Mechanism which requires EU Member States to prepare a 
National Risk Assessment (NRA) and list the priority risks the EU is facing. Six countries 
(Finland, Hungary, Netherlands, Sweden, UK and Norway5) have included space weather 
in their risk assessment. In addition, 20 NRAs contain critical-infrastructure loss or power 
outage scenarios as priority hazards. Space weather could be considered as a trigger of 
these scenarios. The Union Civil Protection Mechanism also requires Member States to 
submit a risk management capability assessment by August 2018. The purpose of this 
assessment is to understand the ability of Member States to address the identified 
priority risks. The risk-management capability should include administrative, technical 
and financial factors. Recently, the EU Disaster Risk Management Knowledge Centre has 
been set up as a tool to better exploit research results, further cooperation across the 
EU, and bring science and policy together. Space weather could be included in this 
initiative, e.g. in terms of early warning, and to provide capacity-building support. 
Europe has been active in the space sector for several decades and it has actively 
contributed to space-weather research through involvement in milestone space missions, 
such as SOHO, ACE and STEREO. The EU has funded over 30 research projects related to 
space weather and its impacts through its 7th Framework Programme (FP7) 2007 – 2013 
                                          
4 GNSS: Global Navigation Satellite System, e.g. GPS, GLONASS, GALILEO, BeiDou 
5 Although Norway is not a member of the EU it participates in the EU Civil Protection Mechanism. 
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and the Horizon 2020 programme for the period 2014 – 2020. An overview of these 
projects is available via the European Space Weather Portal (www.spaceweather.eu). The 
resources associated with these programmes have led to milestone results in space-
weather research, service developments and international collaboration. An example is 
the FP7 AFFECTS (Advanced Forecast For Ensuring Communications Through Space) 
project which studied impacts on the ionosphere and the effects on communication. 
Through its website, the project provides event awareness by offering space-weather 
services (e.g. Kp6, aurora RSS feeds), space-weather reports and alerts based on solar-
activity analysis, subscription services for flares, CMEs, and Solar Energetic Particles 
(SEP), CME databases, modelling results, etc. Further EU funding is essential for the 
research-to-operations path (instruments, mission development, underlying science), 
including ground-based infrastructures.  
The European Space Agency ESA is mandated by its member countries to protect space 
and ground assets against adverse effects from space via its Space Situational 
Awareness (SSA) programme. Space weather has been identified as a threat and has 
recently become the largest SSA area. A cost/benefit analysis of the potential 
consequences of a major space-weather event highlighted that the costs can be 
significant. The analysis also clearly showed the economic benefits of using alert services. 
ESA does not have its own space weather centre but it coordinates a virtual network of 
expert groups in various ESA member countries that provide space-weather services. It 
offers 140 products in 17 different space-weather domains. Subscription services issue 
alerts depending on the interests of the user. These alerts provide information on what is 
happening in space but not how the space environment will affect, e.g., spacecraft 
operations. A service for power-grid operations that has become available very recently 
capitalises on the results of the European EURISGIC project. It provides data on the 
geomagnetic field and its change, the geoelectric field, and the geomagnetically induced 
currents (GIC) in a model power grid with a simplified grid topology. 40-min GIC 
forecasts are based on ground-based magnetometer data. Currently, the service covers 
only Scandinavia. The future objective of the SSA space-weather segment is a system of 
small missions with hosted payload to measure the space environment in low-Earth, 
medium-Earth and geostationary orbits. In addition, new applications are planned to fill 
gaps in current service capability. This includes benchmarking and validation of the 
services provided by the Expert Service Centres, and focussed developments of services 
and physics-based models. 
The US Department of State plays a coordination and clearance role in international 
space cooperation. In its coordination role, it leads on government-to-government 
framework agreements, and in its clearance role on agency-to-agency implementing 
agreements. The US National Space Policy issued in 2010 includes as goals the expansion 
of international cooperation and the improvement of space-based Earth and solar 
observation capabilities needed to forecast near-Earth space weather. Multiple efforts are 
underway across US government agencies and internationally to increase awareness of 
space-weather risks. This has much increased the coordination on the topic across US 
agencies. For example, the FEMA7 Federal Interagency Response Plan will include a long-
term power-outage annex, and FERC8 has issued a rule on the development of grid 
reliability standards for geomagnetic disturbances. 
The National Space Weather Strategy was released by the White House in October 2015. 
It defines the specific actions that US Federal agencies must undertake to prepare for 
and respond to space-weather storms, as well as the timelines for completion of these 
actions. The Strategy has six goals, including the improvement of assessment, modelling 
and prediction of impacts on critical infrastructure, and the enabling of increased 
international cooperation. This includes data sharing and research, cooperation on space-
                                          
6 The planetary index Kp provides a measure of the level of geomagnetic activity over a three-hour interval 
based on magnetometer measurements. The index ranges from 0 to 9. 
7 FEMA: Federal Emergency Management Agency 
8 FERC: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission 
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weather products and services, and a collaborative approach to extreme space-weather 
preparedness. In October 2016 an Executive Order on preparing the nation for space 
weather was issued by the US President. It defines the roles and responsibilities of the 
various Federal government agencies in preparedness, response and recovery and their 
authority to direct, suspend or control critical infrastructures before, during and after a 
space-weather event. 
The Roadmap prepared by COSPAR/ILWS, a joint undertaking of the Committee on 
Space Research and the International Living With a Star programme, aims to protect 
society’s technological infrastructure sectors by laying out a path for advancing space-
weather science. It focuses on high-priority challenges and prioritises those advances 
that can be made on short, intermediate and decadal time scales. The roadmap tries to 
answer fundamental questions related to processes on the Sun, the near-Earth space 
environment after a solar eruption, and it aims to understand how technology and 
society would be affected and could respond to the threat.  
The roadmap’s highest-priority recommendations refer to research (observational, 
computational, and theoretical needs), teaming (coordinated collaborative research 
environment) and bridging communities (collaboration between agencies and 
communities). Recommendations are separated into pathways which reflect a merged 
weighting based on assessed societal impact, scientific needs, estimated feasibility, and 
likelihood of near-term success. Pathways are designed to meet the differential needs of 
the various user groups. For example, recommendations on observational, computational 
and theoretical needs are divided into 3 pathways, which focus on 1) impacts of 
GMD9/GIC on electrical systems, 2) the particle environment of (aero)space assets, and 
3) pre-event forecasts of flares and solar particle events. These pathways can only be 
achieved through interagency coordination and for each pathway there is a need for the 
deployment of new or additional space- or ground-based instrumentation. 
The key points from the first session are: 
• Extreme space weather has a global footprint and can affect multiple ground- and 
space-based infrastructures at the same time. An event of such magnitude could 
overwhelm a single nation’s response capacity. 
• The probability of an extreme Carrington-type geomagnetic storm is assumed to be 
6-12% within the next decade. 
• Some countries have recognised the threat of extreme space weather and have 
included it in their strategic national risk assessment for better preparedness 
planning. 
• National and international initiatives have been launched to facilitate collaboration on 
research, preparedness and response planning, and multilateral coordination in 
response.  
• Europe is actively contributing to space-weather research through involvement in 
space missions and the funding of research projects related to space weather and its 
impacts. 
• The USA has issued a National Space Weather Strategy that defines high-level 
strategic goals and actions for increasing preparedness levels. 
                                          
9 GMD: Geomagnetic Disturbance 
7 
3 Space weather impacts and risk reduction 
3.1 Known vulnerabilities to space weather and risk reduction 
Many different types of critical infrastructures are known to be vulnerable to space 
weather. Four speakers from the UK National Grid, SolarMetrics Consulting, JRC, and 
Atkins presented the vulnerability of the power grid, aviation, GNSS, and rail to space 
weather and discussed the potentially resulting problems with respect to service 
disruption and cascading effects.  
There is historic evidence dating back to the 1940s that power grids are vulnerable to the 
impact of geomagnetic storms via the generation of GICs that enter the grid. The 1989 
Quebec blackout was a wake-up call for the power industry, followed by the 2003 
Halloween storm with a blackout in Sweden and damage to several transformers in South 
Africa. Since high-voltage equipment is more susceptible to GIC, power transmission 
systems are particularly at risk. On the other hand, GIC cannot penetrate into the 
distribution network which is less vulnerable due to the higher line resistances and lower 
voltages. Distribution networks might, however, suffer outages through secondary 
impacts. Highly connected networks are also less vulnerable as the GIC would be spread 
over more network branches. Potential GIC-related damage paths involve high-voltage 
transformers (half-cycle saturation, harmonics, heating), or voltage fluctuations and line 
tripping that can cause power outages. Once the power grid fails there will be ripple 
effects to all sectors that rely on power, i.e. food and fuel distribution, water, transport, 
industry, etc.  
An assessment of the potential space-weather risks to the UK transmission grid suggests 
that only Carrington-type events, assumed to have a 100-year return period, could cause 
disruptions. Nevertheless, widespread transformer damage and grid collapse would be 
rather unlikely. It is estimated that 20 transformers at most would be affected by 
extreme space weather. Since this constitutes only about 1% of all transformers in the 
UK grid, only local blackouts would be expected. National Grid relies on design (e.g. GIC-
resistant transformer design, voltages lower than 400 kV, transformer spares) and on 
operational mitigation to handle the effects of geomagnetic storms. Operational 
measures include return to service of items out for maintenance and switching in of all 
circuits (required lead time 3-4 days), connection of all Supergrid Transformers to 
distribute the GIC (lead time 2-3 days), extra reactive power support, extra staff, etc.  
National Grid maintains a close relationship with the Met Office who provides them with 
customised space-weather forecasts. Forecasting requirements are that operators should 
receive a warning up to five days in advance of a geomagnetic storm to take all 
necessary measures to protect the grid. For very fast CMEs, which take no more than 18 
hours to arrive, this is currently not the case. Ideally, forecasting capabilities should be 
improved to allow prediction of the likelihood and expected size of a CME 3-4 days prior 
to its eruption, prediction of the CME’s magnetic orientation once launched from the Sun, 
better accuracy of its arrival time at Earth, and an estimate of the geomagnetic 
disturbance intensity caused by the CME.  
Aviation has been subject to space-weather impacts on numerous occasions with 
significant economic losses. For example, in 2005 the total cost of extra fuel used for 
rerouting flights from polar routes due to space weather amounted to $186 million 
(excluding costs to passengers and compensation). Space weather impacts aviation in 
various ways, including through satellite navigation (GPS system availability, position 
errors), avionics upsets/failures, communication loss, and additional human radiation 
exposure. Aviation does not at the moment rely exclusively on GPS for navigation. For 
example, in the USA the WAAS10 is based on GPS. If it is impacted by space weather, like 
in October 2003, ground-based systems provide support for aircraft navigation. Since 
these back-up systems are expensive to maintain and there is a trend towards reducing 
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redundancies to be more cost effective, there is concern that the associated risks for 
navigation might not be fully appreciated. 
The impacts on avionics are a problem that is not yet considered significant by airlines 
although incidents where space weather is suspected have been documented (e.g. 
Quantas Flight 72 in which un-commanded inputs to flight controls were reported, 
causing injuries to passengers and the crew). There are several backups depending on 
how flight-critical a system is. Nevertheless, flight electronics are becoming smaller as 
technology progresses which increases their susceptibility to space weather. Loss of HF 
communications as a primary safety-critical tool for communication is already recognised 
as an issue. It is the primary communication tool in remote areas (polar regions and 
oceans) which traffic management and airlines use to communicate. Together with 
navigation, loss of communications is an issue that is potentially safety-relevant and can 
- in the worst case - result in the closure of airspace. 
It was suggested that better communication between scientists and industry is needed to 
provide relevant, reliable and usable information to the aviation sector for decision 
making. The information available today does not fulfil these criteria. This would enhance 
awareness and understanding of the risks in the sector, and improve global emergency 
response should an extreme event occur. In addition, there is a need for standardisation 
of space-weather information and guidance, improved education and training, as well as 
for risk and cost/benefit analysis. 
GNSS is increasingly used for precise timing and positioning in a variety of applications 
(e.g. eNavigation, offshore oil and gas drilling, precision farming), making them 
vulnerable to space-weather impact. Recent studies recommend increased resilience of 
and backups for positioning, navigation and timing services used in critical 
infrastructures. The JRC investigates the vulnerability of GNSS to natural and 
anthropogenic interference sources (jamming, spoofing) and their impacts on GNSS 
receivers. In order to support the development of more resilient receivers, the JRC has 
deployed ionospheric scintillation monitoring stations in Peru, Norway and Vietnam, as 
well as two stations in Antarctica in collaboration with a European research consortium. 
Scintillation events are recorded at the monitoring stations and played back at the JRC to 
test standard receivers used, e.g., by aviation. This supports the development of GNSS 
receivers that are less vulnerable to space-weather impact but also the preparation of 
standards for enhanced receiver reliability. The JRC hosts a database of scintillation 
events (intermediate frequency data) sourced from the monitoring stations during 
periods of high ionospheric activity. This data is made available to the research 
community for free. Future work will investigate the potential of using Formosat-
3/COSMIC data, as well as information from the International Ground Station (IGS) 
network, to monitor ionospheric scintillation. 
Space-weather impacts on rail have been documented in Sweden and Russia, with 
disruptions to signalling as the primary effect. However, the rail industry lags behind the 
power and aviation sectors with respect to awareness of and protection against space 
weather. Atkins carried out an initial study to understand the vulnerability of the UK rail 
network to extreme space weather and its impacts on safety and operability, under the 
assumption that an event had already occurred. The study highlighted a strong 
susceptibility of rail assets to space weather due to direct impacts on the infrastructure 
and indirectly via its dependence on power, GNSS and radio communications. On the one 
hand, GICs entering rail equipment, e.g. rolling-stock transformers or track-circuit feed 
transformers, may result in transformer failure and train shut-down, or signalling 
equipment producing right-side failures11. Also line current monitoring equipment may 
interpret the quasi-DC GICs as incorrect train operation and shut the train down. There is 
a theoretical risk that GIC induced or directly coupled into a rail may lead to wrong-side 
failure which raises strong safety concerns. On the other hand, a power outage would 
indirectly affect train operations, with train batteries lasting no longer than 90-120 
                                          
11 Right-side failure is a condition in railway signaling that results in a safe state. Wrong-side failure causes an 
unsafe state. 
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minutes, signalling, and services at train stations, including lighting. In this context, 
there is concern about self-evacuation and panic behaviour with passengers stranded in 
trains or blocked at stations. The failure of GNSS has presently not been identified as a 
safety concern. However, GPS plays a key role in maintaining timing on the GSM-R12 
network, as well as in the line-side telecommunications system. GPS is also used for 
Selective Door Opening to determine the location of the train on the rail network, and for 
supporting the train’s propulsion system. Radio communications that use directional 
antennas, such as GSM-R, would only be disrupted during sunrise and sunset. However, 
their loss could be critical during emergencies. Interestingly, there is also a risk to track-
side staff during extreme space weather due to the unexpected activation of protection 
system by GICs in conductors. 
The Atkins study also came up with recommendations for research, forecasting and 
warning, and monitoring and measuring. Most importantly, the study recommends to 
close existing knowledge gaps related to single-event effects, track-circuit interference, 
and GNSS dependency, while at the same time considering the potential for multiple and 
simultaneous impacts. The Rail Delivery Group and Network Rail have expressed interest 
in understanding how they would respond to a space-weather warning. 
The main conclusions from this session are: 
• Past space-weather impacts on different types of critical infrastructures (e.g. power 
grid, aviation, transport, GNSS) have been documented. 
• Power transmission grids have been hardened in some countries based on past 
impacts. In the UK, it is believed that only Carrington-type geomagnetic storms would 
be able to cause disruptions to grid operations. 
• In some countries, customised models for GIC prediction and impact assessment 
have been developed. 
• Aviation is vulnerable to extreme space weather due to radiation exposure, loss of 
communications and navigation, and impacts on avionics. These aspects are 
considered safety-relevant. 
• GNSS, and as a consequence the applications that depend on it, is vulnerable to 
space-weather impacts. There may be GNSS dependencies embedded in systems 
without infrastructure operators knowing about them. 
• Space weather can affect rail either via direct impacts (e.g. GICs in transformers or 
rail tracks) or indirectly through dependencies on other critical infrastructures that 
are vulnerable (power, communications, navigation). 
• Better communication between science and industry is needed to provide relevant, 
reliable and usable information to operators for decision making. 
3.2 National space-weather risk management and forecasting 
Early warning and preparedness are essential for limiting the effects of space-weather 
impacts. In this session four speakers from the Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency, the 
UK Government Office for Science, NOAA and the UK Met Office presented examples of 
national approaches to managing space-weather risks and gave an overview of available 
space-weather forecasting services in the USA and the UK. 
The Swedish Civil Contingencies Agency MSB is tasked with preventing and preparing for 
emergencies and crises from all causes, be they natural or man-made, in collaboration 
with public and private stakeholders. It has published a National Risk and Capability 
Assessment (NRCA) with the aim to identify and analyse risks, vulnerabilities and 
society’s capability to prevent and respond to these risks. The results of the NRCA are a 
strategic basis for directing and developing the Swedish civil contingency system. In the 
frame of the NRCA, solar storms were identified as a particularly serious threat and a 
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scenario of extreme space weather affecting Sweden was developed. This scenario 
assumed the occurrence of a Carrington-type event with major disruptions to satellite 
signals and HF communications, as well as a power blackout in southern and central 
Sweden due to voltage collapse. It aimed to understand the potential consequences for 
the over 8 million people living in the affected area (Sweden’s total population is close to 
10 million). The major challenges identified in the immediate aftermath of the space-
weather event relate to cascading effects due to the power blackout, such as shortage of 
drinking water, loss of communications, impacts on transportation, fuel supply, food, and 
healthcare. There is also a risk of civil unrest. Based on these observations it was 
concluded that backup power is a key factor for ensuring that critical societal functions 
can be maintained throughout the event. This should be supported by improved warning 
systems and reliable/user-friendly forecasts and warnings. Awareness, especially within 
the civil-protection community, was highlighted as essential for minimising risks, as well 
as more knowledge of the event dynamics. The space-weather scenario is included in 
many strategic training courses.  
In the UK, the space-weather risk is owned by the Met Office while the role of the 
Government Office for Science is to translate science into policy. In the frame of the 
European Commission’s call for the preparation of a National Risk Assessment, the UK 
also indicated space weather as one of the priority risks the country might face. Severe 
space weather has been included in the UK’s National Risk Register with a relative 
likelihood of occurring over the next five years between 1 in 20 and 1 in 2 and an overall 
relative impact score of 3 (out of 5). There is debate if the risk is represented correctly, 
and a revised NRA will be published at the end of 2016 to reflect the increased 
understanding of impacts on other sectors. In this context, space weather might be 
reclassified as less likely (between 1 in 200 and 1 in 20) but with a higher impact (score 
4 out of 5). In support of space-weather forecasting and alerting, the Met Office 
forecasting centre was developed which provides general but also tailored services to its 
user groups. The Cabinet Office works with local first responders, National Grid, the rail 
network and the aviation sector on a preparedness strategy for extreme space weather. 
In 2015, a Strategic Defence & Security Review recognised the important place in 
security of space infrastructures and their vulnerability to space weather. In the same 
year, the Government Office for Science carried out a space-weather table-top exercise 
with different industry sectors to raise awareness, understand how to best communicate 
space-weather risks to operators and the public, and to foster dialogue about extreme 
risk with high uncertainties. The next steps will follow up on the results of the table-top 
exercise and address the identified gaps. 
In the USA, the NOAA Space Weather Prediction Center is the official source of space-
weather alerts and warnings which go out to thousands of people and are used by 
government agencies and infrastructure operators alike. In support of the alert process, 
NOAA has developed space-weather scales, similar to existing hurricane or tornado 
scales, which the alerts are largely based on. These scales categorise solar flares (radio 
blackouts – R-scale), solar radiation storms (S-scale), and geomagnetic storms (G-
scale). For alerts of solar flares, text and graphic products are available to the users. This 
includes graphics that show the areas of highest impact on HF communications on Earth 
as a function of time. Only probabilistic forecasts of the conditions favourable for 
triggering eruptive activity on the Sun are possible. When and where a sunspot cluster 
will emerge cannot be predicted. Similarly, forecasting of the occurrence and size of a 
flare is also not possible. Also for solar radiation storms, text and graphic products are 
available. There is some understanding of the underlying processes and hence some 
forecasting capability, but with significant limitations. For major radiations storms in 
progress, high-confidence persistence forecasts can be provided with 24 hour or more 
lead time. However, it is often the case that information can be given to aviation with 
only very little advance notice (sometimes only minutes). 
Geomagnetic-storm forecasts are divided into three phases: watch, warning and alert. 
Forecasters observe and measure CMEs from the SOHO and STEREO spacecraft. A 
geomagnetic storm watch is issued upon detection of an Earth-directed CME with a lead 
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time of typically 1-3 days. Subsequently, the WSA-Enlil model is run to determine the 
characteristics of solar winds and CMEs, and the likely arrival time of the CME at Earth. 
This is a key piece of information for power-grid operators to take protective action, e.g. 
delaying maintenance, switching lines back in, etc. When the CME is detected at the ACE 
spacecraft about 15-45 minutes before impacting Earth, a geomagnetic storm warning is 
released. At the current state of science, this is the moment when the CME’s magnetic 
field orientation can be confirmed and it becomes known if a strong geomagnetic storm is 
to be expected. This presents a serious limitation to modelling and consequently, to mid- 
to long-range forecasting. An alert is issued when the storm is detected in the ground-
based magnetometers of the US Geological Survey. Awareness of the risks associated 
with space weather is growing and there has been a steep customer increase of SWPC’s 
products since the inception of the subscription service in 2005. Through this service, 
and through phone alerts for certain high-profile customers, SWPC reaches out to 
operators, government agencies (e.g. FEMA, FAA13) and the White House to ensure 
coordinated action for preparedness and response.  
The UK Met Office has created the Met Office Space Weather Operations Centre 
(MOSWOC) which is fully integrated within the Met Office Operations Centre. Currently, it 
is Europe’s only operational manned 24/7 forecasting capability and it provides UK-
centric advisories to support the Government, military and critical infrastructure sectors, 
and it coordinates with NOAA SWPC from both an operational and strategic perspective. 
Customised impact descriptions that reflect infrastructure architectures and 
vulnerabilities in the UK have been added to the NOAA space-weather scales. MOSWOC 
observes and provides synoptic analyses of sunspot regions, as well as space-weather 
related raw data and analyses prepared by Met Office teams for the different user 
groups. Technical forecasts and guidance are provided free of charge to infrastructure 
operators and consist of text and graphic products (e.g. colour-coded impact matrices). 
MOSWOC also offers tailored services, e.g. for terrestrial or satellite communications. 
These services provide customised information to address the needs of specific 
infrastructure sectors. Preparedness plans also include a protocol that will be activated in 
case of a major space-weather event after discussion with the central government and 
the UK Space Weather Expert Group. 
The key points from this session are: 
• In the frame of its national risk assessment, Sweden has identified solar storms as a 
priority threat and has developed a space-weather scenario for Sweden assuming a 
Carrington-type event. 
• The UK has included extreme space weather in its risk register and the government 
works with local responders, National Grid, and the rail and aviation sectors on a 
preparedness strategy. 
• In Europe and the USA, 24/7 space-weather forecasting capabilities are available to 
support the early warning of government and industry. 
• There is a need for consistency in forecasting, and coordination of forecasts from 
different service providers is required. 
• Significant knowledge gaps in physical and impact modelling persist. These gaps 
strongly affect early-warning capabilities and preparedness in industry. 
• Geomagnetic-storm forecasting is hampered by the limited understanding of the 
CME’s magnetic field orientation, reducing warning times significantly. 
 
                                          
13 FAA: Federal Aviation Administration 
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4 Interdependencies and crisis response 
The potential failure of critical infrastructures during extreme space weather can lead to 
cascading effects to other sectors and overwhelm national response capacities. In the 
final session of the summit three speakers from the JRC, IIASA14 and the UK Government 
Office for Science discussed interdependencies between critical infrastructures, the 
governance of transboundary risks, and lessons learned on crisis response from a 
national space-weather emergency exercise. 
In the EU, the European Programme on Critical Infrastructure Protection (EPCIP) is one 
of the key initiatives providing a policy background for critical-infrastructure protection. 
In December 2008, the Directive 2008/114/EC on the "Identification and designation of 
European Critical Infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their 
protection" was adopted. In 2013, the European Commission published a staff working 
document on a revised approach to EPCIP. In this document, the importance of resilience 
and interdependencies in critical infrastructures is clearly mentioned, as well as the need 
to develop the associated methodologies and tools. Accordingly, the JRC has launched a 
research activity addressing these issues for different applications and levels of 
granularity. Complex dynamical networks theory is applied to the modelling and criticality 
assessment of interdependent critical infrastructures (e.g. energy and information 
networks). Functional modelling methods are exploited to systematically represent 
causes, drivers and effects of critical events on service networks. Economic impact and 
disservice propagation assessment is also involved in the process, based on dynamic 
inoperability input/output models. In order to support these analyses, the JRC has set up 
a Geospatial Risk and Resilience Assessment Platform. 
During extreme space weather there is a risk that critical-infrastructure disruptions will 
cross a nation’s borders. Recent transboundary effects of power-grid outages from other 
causes have already been documented. New requirements on grid architecture have 
increased the vulnerability of the power grid to multiple risks (e.g. diversification of 
electricity supply in different areas, deployment of renewable energy sources in zones far 
from consumption centres, grids at the limit of their capacity, etc.). In light of these 
findings, there is a need for multi-risk assessment but also for multi-risk governance to 
address issues related to the multiplicity of incident triggers, the risks of cascading 
effects, and the many different stakeholders that manage the risk often in isolation from 
each other. The latter is a problem in particular for interconnected networks within the 
European electricity market, where each transmission system operator is only responsible 
for the operation of his own network. To avoid cascading effects, regional coordination is 
necessary to assess risks and ensure the effectiveness of operational decisions and 
remedial actions taken.  
Multi-risk governance is subject to many challenges, including interactions between risks, 
multiple hazards in interdependency, knowledge and capacity transfer, gaps between 
science and implementation, institutional barriers for implementation of a multi-risk 
approach, and different national or regional patterns for stakeholder coordination and 
participation. Furthermore, behavioural and cognitive biases influence decision-making in 
multi-hazard situations. Decision-support tools can facilitate risk governance in multi-risk 
situations, however, the views of users from academia and practice (civil protection) on 
their usefulness differ significantly and should be taken into consideration. A study on the 
application of decision-support tools in these user communities showed that scientists 
appreciate these tools for ranking and comparing risk scenarios to set risk-reduction 
priorities, as well as for uncertainty characterisation and sensitivity analysis. 
Stakeholders from civil protection, on the other hand, apply these tools for increasing 
transparency in decision making and breaking down complex decisions into components 
to support communication and training. The study further recommends the 
implementation of a multi-risk approach through the creation of multi-risk platforms to 
understand and communicate key risk components to communities, and the 
                                          
14 IIASA: International Institute for Systems Analysis 
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establishment of local multi-risk commissions to liaise between local communities and 
risk-management experts. It was pointed out that a multi-risk approach cannot be 
subsidiary to a single-risk approach. A recent OSCE15 handbook on the protection of 
national and transnational networks from natural and man-made disasters compiles 
effective risk-management concepts, tools and case studies to guide practitioners in the 
field. 
In case of national emergencies in the UK, the national emergency coordination group 
COBRA16 convenes. COBRA meetings are chaired by the UK Prime Minister. The scientific 
consensus is brought into the meeting by the Government Chief Scientific Adviser who 
heads the Scientific Advisory Group on Emergencies (SAGE). Extreme space weather has 
been recognised as a priority threat the UK is preparing for. To test overall preparedness 
levels, SAGE organised a space-weather emergency exercise involving multiple 
stakeholders in 2015. The exercise included space-weather experts, infrastructure 
operators, and regulators. The scope of the exercise was limited to selected 
infrastructure sectors only (power grid, aviation, rail, maritime transport) and experts 
from some areas were absent (e.g. from avionics, communications, satellites). 
Communications will be tested in a separate exercise. 
The exercise showed that the UK National Grid is prepared well for potential space-
weather impacts and has effective emergency-management plans in place. It was noted 
that the exercise was artificial in the sense that no warning lead time was given to the 
operator. In a real event, the operator would monitor space-weather alerts as they 
progress and would be able to put protective measures in place before the situation 
became critical. The UK aviation sector was less well prepared, but it was recognised that 
this sector operates in a complex international system and there are currently no 
standard operating procedures in case of a major space-weather event or any 
coordination of the response. Proper command structures and communication plans 
would be helpful for passengers and pilots. This should include information for pilots on 
the radiation levels they were exposed to during the event and if they are still cleared to 
fly afterwards. 
The UK rail sector takes note of space-weather alerts but is uncertain as to how to react 
and turn them into decisions. Alerts would be required that specify where exactly a 
problem is expected in the rail network. In addition, the rail sector is confident that 
signals would fail safe (right-side failure) in case of space weather, although there is no 
certainty in science to substantiate this belief. Maritime transport has good general 
emergency procedures in place but it is unclear how the sector would handle space-
weather impacts, in particular if coupled with adverse weather conditions. The overall 
conclusion of the emergency exercise was that for rail, aviation, and communications 
there is no specific planning in the UK, however progress is being made to address this 
issue. There will be follow-up workshops to the exercise that explicitly target these 
sectors. 
The key conclusions from this session are: 
• In the EU, the European Programme on Critical Infrastructure Protection is one of the 
key initiatives that provides a policy background for critical infrastructure protection. 
• There are important challenges associated with interdependencies between critical 
infrastructures, and there is a need to develop associated assessment methodologies 
and tools. 
• New requirements on grid architecture have increased the vulnerability of the power 
grid to multiple risks, including space weather, and transboundary effects from recent 
power outages have already been documented. 
                                          
15 OSCE: Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe 
16 COBRA: UK government emergency-response committee set up to respond to a national or regional crisis. It 
is named after Cabinet Office Briefing Room A. 
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• A multi-risk governance approach is needed to address issues related to the risks of 
cascading effects and the many different stakeholders that manage the risk often in 
isolation from each other. 
• A space-weather exercise in the UK showed that National Grid is prepared well for 
such an extreme event, but other infrastructure sectors may not be. 
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5 Table-top exercise 
5.1 Early warning and preparedness 
The first part of the exercise focused on understanding space-weather warning 
possibilities, including how they translate into stakeholder preparedness, and the 
limitations of current forecasting capabilities. The participants worked in breakout groups 
on the first part of the scenario which included alerts for radio blackouts and radiation 
storms on 9-11 January. They were then asked to discuss the following questions: 
1. How would you expect to be alerted of a potential extreme space-weather event? 
2. Which contingency plans would you expect to be in place at national level to deal with 
such an event? 
3. Should action to an event of this severity be coordinated across Europe or can it be 
managed at national or organisation level? 
In response to the first question, the groups indicated that they would expect email and 
phone alerts should an extreme space-weather event occur, with follow-up phone calls. 
Information could “piggy-back” also on other existing routes for information sharing, e.g. 
broadcasting. Messages should be targeted to those stakeholders who can act upon the 
alert, and a clear protocol is needed to define the actors responsible for providing 
information, and for coordinating and initiating action. For alerts to be effective, 
information on the potential consequences of an impact needs to have been 
communicated to the stakeholders already prior to an event to educate them on the 
effects and on how to react. This information should include an articulation of the 
uncertainties associated with the issue.  
The UK and the USA have contingency plans for extreme space weather (Question 2). In 
particular, there are well-defined processes in place for the protection of the power 
transmission grid. It was mentioned that in other countries contingency plans for general 
power blackouts exist. Although they are not specific to space-weather impacts, they 
could still help to mitigate the impacts of an extreme event. However, most emergency 
plans for power blackouts assume that other critical infrastructures, e.g. transportation 
and communications, are operational. This assumption is likely not valid during/after an 
extreme geomagnetic storms. There is also a need to develop national contingency plans 
for wide-range loss of communications and GNSS. 
Extreme space weather could potentially impact large parts of Europe. In response to the 
third question, the groups indicated that pan-European guidelines on how to address the 
threat would be helpful considering that many critical infrastructures (e.g. power grid, 
transportation) are interconnected across borders. However, it was pointed out that 
crisis-response decisions would be taken nationally, and coordination across Europe 
would not necessarily be considered a priority. It was suggested to define the areas for 
which coordination at European level would provide added value and those that should be 
managed on a national scale. For example, there was consensus that emergency plans 
for securing water and food supplies need to held nationally. 
The exercise continued with a situation update of a fast CME launched towards Earth on 
13 January and arriving one day after the warning. An alert for an extreme geomagnetic 
storm is issued which is classified as a Carrington-type storm. With this information, the 
breakout groups were asked to discuss the following two questions: 
1. Are additional observational and modelling capabilities needed to provide the 
stakeholders with the information they require at this point in the scenario? If not, 
what are the key gaps and priorities? 
2. Which information could and should be shared with the public at this stage? Should 
information be restricted to general space-weather forecasts or already include 
predictions of potential impacts? 
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Replying to the first question, all participant groups agreed that there are still significant 
gaps in the modelling of physical phenomena and impacts that affect preparedness 
levels. There was consensus that one priority need is to determine the orientation of the 
magnetic field of an Earth-directed CME before it reaches L117 to extend warning lead 
times for infrastructure operators. Other identified gaps relate to ionospheric forecasting 
and the lack of an end-to-end Sun-Earth interaction model. On the impact side, 
capabilities need to be created or improved with respect to predicting CME arrival times, 
the probability and size of an impact, and the granularity of the forecasts. Customised 
warning messages should be available for each country, as not all countries will be 
equally affected. Since infrastructure operators require local or regional information to 
prepare in the best possible way, impact maps per space-weather effect would be highly 
desirable (e.g. power-grid impacts vs. geomagnetic storm magnitude across Europe). It 
was pointed out that authorities would have to know when conditions have stabilised to 
commence remedial action. 
At this stage of the scenario, all infrastructure owners should have been made aware of 
the situation (Question 2). In the UK, the government would not yet issue a warning. 
Rather, the Met Office would publish awareness notices. With respect to information to 
the public it was highlighted that it needs to come from the responsible authorities and 
be understandable and consistent. This information should explain what is happening, 
how it will impact the public, what is being done about it, how long the situation is 
expected to last, and what the public should or should not do. The question was raised 
what the private sector’s (e.g. aviation) responsibilities towards the public are when 
government issues a space-weather warning. 
5.2 Response and recovery 
The second part of the table top exercise addressed the response and recovery phases. It 
aimed to highlight the common challenges EU Member States might have to address in 
this case (situational awareness, communication to sectors, the public, and across 
borders), identify major capacity gaps at national and EU level, and discuss how industry 
and government can reduce the risk of infrastructure disruptions and prepare for 
mitigating their consequences. 
5.2.1 Response 
In a situation update, the breakout groups were informed that on 15 January, the day 
after the CME impact, the resulting extreme geomagnetic storm has led to infrastructure 
disruptions and cascading effects throughout Europe. The power grid is down in 45% of 
the affected area, and many basic societal functions, such as water supply, heating, and 
ATM services, have been disrupted. The fuel supply is limited. Mobile phones and 
landlines are expected to be unusable due to capacity overloads. In the two days that 
follow (16-17 January), power outages persist and several nuclear power plants run on 
back-up power. Police and other emergency responders are affected by communication 
and navigation disruptions. GPS positioning is unavailable across much of the globe. As a 
consequence, hundreds of thousands of people in the affected area are stuck in trains. 
First responders are overloaded and there is a risk of civil unrest. Against this 
background the breakout groups were asked to address the following questions: 
1. What are operator requirements for continued operability and constraints to respond 
to such an event? 
2. Which problems may appear when satellite-based services are temporarily disrupted? 
3. How should the public be informed about the current situation and which information 
should they be given at this stage in the scenario? 
                                          
17 L1: Lagrange Point L1 is located between Earth and the Sun at a distance of about 1.5 million km from Earth. 
The solar wind reaches satellites positioned at L1 about an hour before reaching Earth. 
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In response to the first question, the breakout groups agreed that extreme space 
weather is expected to disrupt many different types of critical infrastructures more or 
less at the same time (e.g. power grid, communications, transport, etc.) with ripple 
effects to nearly every industry sector and in society. One of the main challenges during 
response are the widespread impacts which are not focused on a particular community 
and which can extend across national boundaries. The groups indicated that the main 
driver for response and recovery is to restore the power grid as the backbone of society. 
However, in case of multi-country impacts, pan-European plans for re-establishing power 
in a coordinated way would be required. This includes a transformer spare strategy 
across Europe that has addressed potential interoperability problems. 
The size and cost of Large Power Transformers (LPTs) makes it impossible for all power 
grid operators to hold a reserve stock of more than a few units. In addition, LPTs are 
usually back-ordered and are custom-built to each operator’s specifications. It is unclear 
whether LPTs of two networks may be interchangeable, enabling Member States to assist 
each other in the framework of the solidarity clause. Furthermore, there are only a few 
manufacturers of LPTs in the world, and the lead time to have a LPT delivered may be up 
to a year. Therefore, the pressure on LPT manufacturers in the event of a Carrington-
type storm may be considerable, especially if power systems in production facilities are 
themselves inoperable. 
The availability of the workforce is another important limiting factor for operability and it 
needs to be understood how the problem of missing trained manpower can be alleviated 
to keep essential infrastructures running during the response phase. The groups agreed 
that emergency-response plans, including national and possibly transnational protocols, 
need to be in place before an event to be effective. Access to these plans should not 
require internet or computer availability. Prior to the event, government should also 
prioritise the critical utilities that require power to define where resources are routed 
during response and recovery. 
The main problem related to the temporary disruption of satellite-based services 
(Question 2) is uncertainty about where GNSS dependency is embedded in other 
infrastructure sectors, e.g. via the use of timing signals for synchronisation. This 
dependency may be unknown to the operators. All transportation would be affected to 
some degree (road, rail, maritime, aviation) due to a loss of navigation and 
communications. In addition to potentially causing problems for just-in-time delivery of 
products or essential supplies, this would also impact emergency-response services, 
warranting an assessment of their vulnerability under extreme-event conditions. The 
finance sector would also feel the effects of loss of GNSS as it uses GPS-based timing in 
many applications; weather forecasting would also be hampered. Protocols should be 
established to define priority access to the limited communication possibilities that will 
remain. 
For communicating with the public during the response phase (Question 3), radio would 
be the most likely option, if still operative, because other communications system may 
not be operational immediately at this stage. Emergency-service announcements from 
vehicles or public gatherings, with the participation of local government which speaks 
with a position of authority, might be needed. In Germany, some areas have developed 
information hubs, so-called “lighthouses” which have built-in resilience and can 
communicate with other lighthouses, thereby enabling communication between cities. 
The government is responsible for providing the public with information during response. 
This information should give some level of reassurance but be realistic, provide an 
estimate of the timeframe of the emergency situation, as well as instructions on where to 
get water, food, etc. Interestingly, it was noted that the basic infrastructure in the past 
was much more resilient than today. The many (inter)dependencies of modern 
infrastructures have created inherent vulnerabilities with the accompanying risks. 
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5.2.2 Recovery 
Situation update: On 18 January the power supply is slowly being restored although 
some locations are still without electricity due to transformer damage. Telephone 
communications and broadcasting have returned to service. However, the geomagnetic 
storm has left the society at large without food, water, heating, personnel and life-
sustaining equipment for days. The impacts of the storm on electricity distribution will be 
felt for the coming 6-12 months. The overall economic consequences are substantial and 
correspond to approximately 1-2% of GNP. With this scenario in mind, the breakout 
groups addressed the following questions: 
1. What are the major lessons learned in European infrastructure sectors related to 
emergency preparedness for this type of event? 
2. What are the major challenges for the communication of warnings, risks, and 
mitigation measures taken at national and at EU level? 
3. Which are the common challenges the EU Member States and the EU will have to 
address in such an event? 
Replying to the first question, one of the main lessons identified by the groups is that 
stakeholders need to be convinced that the space-weather threat to critical 
infrastructures is real. National response and recovery plans are essential and should be 
exercised. There is a question as to whether general-purpose plans are sufficient or 
whether they have to be space-weather (multi-disruption) specific. National protocols 
have to be supplemented by pan-European protocols and decision-making in case of an 
emergency. It was indicated that there is currently no European strategic decision-
making capability that could quickly respond to a European crisis. Opportunities offered 
by the European Response Coordination Centre (ERCC) could be explored in this context. 
With respect to the power grid, the different owners in Europe need to collaborate to 
restore power in a controlled manner. This requires pan-European modelling to 
understand how the grids will be impacted by an extreme event and how recovery could 
be achieved in the fastest way. With power restored, food and other goods may, 
however, take longer to recover, a fact the public needs to be aware of. It was 
highlighted that the concept of resilience should be considered more explicitly (e.g. via a 
cost/benefit analysis) when changing technological systems to capture potential 
vulnerabilities introduced in the system when making the change. 
The major communication challenges according to the groups (Question 2) are related to 
the unavailability of the usual mass communication options (e.g. broadcasting) and the 
necessity to provide clear and useful information while at the same time trying to avoid 
panic and civil unrest. Protocols at authority level are needed to ensure that the 
appropriate information is shared. With the existence of different forecasting centres 
there is a risk of inconsistent space-weather forecasts. Coordination (e.g. at EU level) 
should guarantee that disseminated alerts contain consistent information. 
The challenges associated with addressing an extreme event differ between countries as 
they depend on national priorities. However, some common challenges were identified 
when discussing the third question. In the short term, power, food, water, heating, etc. 
and public order and safety will have to be ensured. This involves the implementation of 
measures that will allow people to return to their workplace and the restoration of 
production lines. There will have to be a re-prioritisation of scarce resources, e.g. spare 
parts in limited supply, nationally and possibly even at European level. It is unclear how 
and by whom these resources should be distributed. In the longer term, economic 
recovery from an extreme event will not be without difficulty. Another challenge is the 
rebuilding of trust into utilities and government which will have suffered during the 
emergency, as well as public reaction to the relative performance in neighbouring 
countries and the potential for international tensions. 
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6 The way forward: discussion and recommendations 
The final session of the summit aimed to capture participants’ impressions on the two 
days of the event, discuss strategic and policy issues related to the identified gaps, and 
to provide a basis for the prioritisation of actions for future incident prevention and 
consequence mitigation. 
There was agreement that extreme space weather poses a real threat to a multitude of 
critical infrastructure sectors at the same time, and that the potential impacts may be so 
significant that standard preparedness planning assumptions should be revisited. 
Preparedness plans are mostly based on single infrastructure disruptions whose 
management is rather straightforward, but they would likely not be able to address the 
complex challenges associated with multiple events. Furthermore, the assessment of 
space-weather impacts requires a multi-disciplinary approach by all stakeholders 
(science, engineering, industry, policy) that is not necessarily common for other types of 
risks. A change in mindset may be required to adequately address multi-hazard risks in 
general, and extreme space weather in particular. 
Knowledge gaps related to space-weather modelling and infrastructure vulnerabilities 
persist. For example, it is still not possible to predict the orientation of a CME’s magnetic 
field before it has almost reached Earth, thereby losing valuable time that operators 
would need to implement the most appropriate actions to protect infrastructures. 
Extending predictions on lead time by one day would be an important step towards 
improving preparedness, and science is confident that with a better understanding of 
solar processes this can be accomplished. On the impact side, there is a need for the 
prediction of the probability and size of an impact, and for local or regional forecasts, all 
of which are beyond current scientific capabilities. The importance of having a credible 
worst-case scenario as a baseline for impact assessment was also emphasised. 
Another concern are infrastructure vulnerabilities that operators may not be aware of. 
For example, GNSS dependencies may be embedded in systems without operators 
realising it and consequently there would be no preparedness for loss of GNSS. Further 
work is required to better understand these hidden vulnerabilities as we can only manage 
challenges if we know what they are. Care should be taken to not introduce additional 
vulnerabilities into systems in the frame of technological modernisation processes. For 
existing vulnerabilities, redundancies to mitigate space-weather risks may be required. 
The discussions showed that awareness of space-weather risks is highest among power 
transmission grid operators in some countries and in the aviation sector (for loss of 
communications only). Overall, the power grid appears to be the best prepared 
infrastructure sector, partly because it has experienced space-weather related incidents 
in the past that led to design improvements and accompanying operational mitigation 
measures. Nevertheless, almost nothing is known about the risks of extreme space 
weather to power grids in continental Europe. There was a call for a comprehensive 
vulnerability assessment of the European power grid (including transboundary effects) to 
have a full picture of what could happen Europe-wide in case an extreme geomagnetic 
storm hits. 
From a strategic and policy perspective, the lack of clearly defined roles in Europe was 
highlighted. Suggestions were made for appointing an entity that takes the lead in all 
matters related to space-weather risk mitigation in Europe. This would facilitate pan-
European preparedness planning and coordination in case of a European crisis, as well as 
provide consistency in forecasting and alerting. Currently, there are several support tools 
at EU level in case of a major disaster, neither of which includes, however, strategic 
decision-making power. The solidarity clause will be invoked when a major event 
overwhelms the capacity of a single country to respond. Extreme space weather could be 
an example. The ERCC, a 24/7 emergency operations centre, is becoming the European 
Commission’s hub for response to all crises. It reacts upon receiving a request for 
support from a country. The difficulty of acting at EU level without a mandate from the 
Member States was emphasised. The European Commission is willing to offer all its tools 
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(including risk assessment and scenario building) but there needs to be political support 
due to the sensitivities involved in critical infrastructure protection. 
As a first practical step at EU level, it was suggested to organise an emergency exercise 
testing a scenario in which infrastructures needed for emergency response are 
unavailable. This or other space-weather exercises could be organised as a multi-national 
exercise under the Union Civil Protection Mechanism. The USA are interested in exploring 
the opportunity for collaborating on such a joint European exercise. International 
collaboration is crucial considering the potentially global impact of extreme space 
weather.  
Based on the conclusions of the Summit, the following recommendations for action 
targeting stakeholders in science, industry and policy are proposed:  
Recommendations for science: 
1. Physical models should be improved or - where necessary - new models developed to 
allow a better prediction of CME arrival times, an earlier determination of the 
interplanetary magnetic field orientation, and an estimate of the probability and size 
of the likely impacts. 
2. Forecasting capabilities should be enhanced to provide regional or local forecasts on 
the severity and duration of extreme space weather to ensure the most appropriate 
operator response. 
3. Extreme space-weather scenarios should be defined against which operators can 
benchmark the performance of their infrastructures and develop risk mitigation 
strategies. This should be accompanied by a reference document for all stakeholders 
which includes a clarification of terminology. 
4. Impact models for different types of critical infrastructures and their components 
should be developed to facilitate risk assessment. Cooperation with industry should 
be sought to obtain access to infrastructure-specific data for model verification and 
scenario building. 
5. Methodologies for multi-hazard risk assessment and the modelling of infrastructure 
interdependencies should be developed for a realistic estimate of extreme space-
weather impacts on industry and the ripple effects in society. 
Recommendations for operators: 
1. Operators should be aware that a satisfactory performance of infrastructures during 
moderate space weather does not guarantee continued operability and lack of 
damage during Carrington-type geomagnetic storms. 
2. Also, operators should be aware that during extreme space-weather conditions, areas 
normally unaffected by geomagnetic storms are likely to be hit. Response plans 
should be ready in case of an alert. 
3. A comprehensive vulnerability assessment of the European power transmission grid 
to extreme space weather should be carried out to identify criticalities and the 
possibility of transboundary effects. 
4. Operators should assess if hidden vulnerabilities to space weather are embedded in 
their systems, for example via dependencies on GNSS. 
5. Care should be exercised when modernising technology to ascertain that new 
vulnerabilities to space weather are not inadvertently introduced into systems. 
Recommendations for policy: 
1. A strategic plan should be developed to define the roles of the key players in Europe. 
This can include the establishment of a centralised European strategic decision-
making capability tasked with coordinating space-weather risk mitigation (including 
alerting) and response at a pan-European level. 
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2. Consistency in forecasting needs to be ensured. Protocols are needed to coordinate 
forecasts of different space-weather service providers.  
3. Protocols should be developed that define responsibilities and ensure good 
coordination between the stakeholders before, during and after an extreme event. 
This includes communication of the risks and potential impacts to the public. 
4. Emergency plans for extreme space weather should consider the full range of critical 
infrastructures possibly affected. Once drawn up, these plans need to be tested. 
5. The opportunity for organising a joint space-weather exercise at EU level should be 
explored to test existing response capabilities and identify critical gaps. 
6. It should be determined if further measures may be necessary to guarantee the 
integrity of critical infrastructures and their continued operability in case of a major 
event. 
7. Coordinated strategic investments into developing scientific capability and know-how 
in the EU should be explored. 
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